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ISBN  3–86558–065–3 Abstract:
Following Diamond (1997) and Fecht (2004) we use a model in which ￿nancial market
access of households restrains the e￿ciency of the liquidity insurance that banks’ deposit
contracts provide to households that are subject to idiosyncratic liquidity shocks. But in
contrast to these approaches we assume spacial monopolistic competition among banks.
Since monopoly rents are assumed to bring about ine￿ciencies, improved ￿nancial market
access that limits monopoly rents also entails a positive e￿ect. But this bene￿cial e￿ect
is only relevant if competition among banks does not su￿ciently restrain monopoly rents
already.
Thus our results suggest that in the bank-dominated ￿nancial system of Germany,
in which banks intensely compete for households’ deposits, improved ￿nancial market
access might reduce welfare because it only reduces risk sharing. In contrast, in the
banking system of the U.S., with less competition for households’ deposits, a high level
of households’ ￿nancial market participation might be bene￿cial.
Keywords: Financial Intermediaries, Risk Sharing, Banking Competition, Comparing
Financial Systems
JEL Classi￿cation: E44, G10, G21Non technical summary
Several recent studies have emphasized that the comparably intense retail competition
within the German banking sector has been one of the most important reasons for the
continuously low pro￿tability of German banks. 1 In contrast, the competition between
investment products o￿ered by banks and more market related investments in Germany
is rather limited compared to other countries, such as the US. Corporate stocks and
corporate bonds but also investment fund shares still play a minor role in the portfolio of
German households.
Within a theoretical model the present paper tries to evaluate the welfare implications
of having an intense competition between banks for households funds instead of having a
strong competition between bank products and more ￿nancial market related investments.
In general, competition within the ￿nancial sector is bene￿cial because this limits banks’
monopoly power and thereby reduces the ine￿ciencies associated with this monopoly
power. However, depending on the speci￿c type of competition within the ￿nancial sector
competition might also incur some welfare costs. In particular, competition between
bank deposits and market related investments reduces the liquidity insurance that can be
provided by deposit contracts.
In general, bank deposits o￿er an insurance against idiosyncratic liquidity risks: they
pay a comparably high return if funds are needed after a short period, but pay less than
alternative long-term investments if held for a longer period. Thus deposits implement a
redistribution of funds from those agents that do not have an immediate liquidity need to
those that cannot postpone their consumption. However, if there is strong competition
between bank deposits and market related assets then those households that do not have
an immediate liquidity need can e￿ciently withdraw from this redistribution scheme and
invest into alternative long-term assets. Thus the more e￿cient the access to market-
related investments the less risk-sharing can be provided by bank deposits. Consequently,
in a ￿nancial system in which banks’ market power in the deposit business is limited
by the competition with market related investments, an increasing competition reduces
banks’ market power but comes at the costs of less e￿cient risk-sharing.
In contrast, competition between banks does not entail this negative welfare e￿ect.
A more intense competition for deposits between banks does not reduce the e￿ciency
of the liquidity insurance provided by banks’ deposit contracts. The deposit contract of
all banks entails the same optimal degree of liquidity transformation. Therefore it does
not o￿er a bene￿cial exit option for those households that do not have an immediate
1See, for instance, the IMF’s report "Germany’s Three-Pillar Banking System: Cross-Country Per-
spectives in Europe".consumption need.
Thus according to our analysis a reduction in banks’ monopoly rents due to an increase
in competition from other banks leads to greater welfare than a comparable reduction in
monopoly rents due to an increase in competition from the ￿nancial market. Indeed, while
keeping banks’ monopoly rents and the associated ine￿ciencies at a low level is associated
with some welfare costs in a ￿nancial system characterized by strong competition between
banks and market-related investments, this is not necessarily the case in a ￿nancial system
characterized by a strong competition between banks.
Our analysis also suggests that households’ improved access to market related invest-
ments in recent decades could have been welfare reducing in Germany whereas it might
have been welfare increasing in those ￿nancial systems characterized by a historically
strong competition between banks and market related investments like, for instance, the
US. In the US ￿nancial system the improved ￿nancial market access might have further
reduced the degree of liquidity insurance o￿ered by banks’ deposit contracts. However,
the increased competition between bank deposits and market related investments would
have also entailed a positive welfare e￿ect, because it reduced banks’ monopoly rents.
In Germany, monopoly rents were already su￿ciently limited by the strong competition
between banks. Hence, according to our model, here the increased competition between
banks and market related investments would have only limited the liquidity insurance
provided by deposit contracts.
3Nicht technische Zusammenfassung
Zahlreiche aktuelle Studien f￿hren die anhaltende Ertragsschw￿che deutscher Banken ins-
besondere auf den intensiven Wettbewerb im Privatkundengesch￿ft zur￿ck. 2 Im interna-
tionalen Vergleich, zum Beispiel mit den USA, ist dagegen der Wettbewerb in Deutschland
zwischen Bankeinlagen und alternativen, st￿rker kapitalmarktorientierten Anlageproduk-
ten relativ moderat. So machen Aktien und Unternehmensanleihen, aber auch Invest-
mentfondsanteile nach wie vor einen vergleichsweise geringen Teil des Portfolios privater
Haushalte aus.
Im Rahmen eines theoretischen Modells vergleicht das vorliegende Papier die Wohl-
fahrtsimplikationen eines Finanzsystems, das wie das deutsche durch intensiven Wett-
bewerb zwischen Banken gepr￿gt ist, mit denen eines Finanzsystems, das wie das US-
amerikanische eher durch einen intensiven Wettbewerb zwischen Banken und anderen An-
lageformen charakterisiert ist. Allgemein ist ein hoher Wettbewerbsgrad im Finanzsektor
wichtig, um die Monopolmacht und die hieraus resultierenden Ine￿zienzen zu begrenzen.
Allerdings kann der Wettbewerb im Finanzsektor auch mit Kosten, d.h. Wohlfahrtsein-
bu￿en, verbunden sein. So f￿hrt der Wettbewerb zwischen Bankeinlagen und kapitalmarkt-
orientierten Anlageformen beispielsweise zu einer Verminderung der Liquidit￿tsversiche-
rung, die durch Bankeinlagen bereitgestellt werden kann.
Generell bieten Bankeinlagen Haushalten eine Liquidit￿tsversicherung gegen idiosyn-
kratische Liquidit￿tsschocks. Der Ertrag von Bankeinlagen ist vergleichsweise hoch, wenn
die Einlagen bereits nach kurzer Zeit aufgel￿st werden m￿ssen. Dagegen bieten Bankein-
lagen, wenn sie l￿ngerfristig gehalten werden, oft eine geringere Verzinsung als langfristige
Kapitalmarktanlagen. Insofern implementieren Einlagenvertr￿ge eine implizite Umvertei-
lung von solchen Einlegern, die keinen unmittelbaren Liquidit￿tsbedarf haben und daher
ihre Einlagen langfristig halten, hin zu solchen Einlegern, die ihre Liquidit￿t fr￿hzeitig
zur￿ck ben￿tigen. Der Grad der Liquidit￿tsversicherung, der durch den Einlagenver-
trag erm￿glicht werden kann, h￿ngt allerdings vom Zugang zu alternativen Investitions-
m￿glichkeiten ab. K￿nnen Haushalte sehr e￿zient in alternative langfristige Anlagen
investieren￿besteht also ein intensiver Wettbewerb zwischen Bankeinlagen und kapital-
marktorientierten Anlageformen￿so k￿nnen sich solche Einleger, die keinen unmittelbaren
Liquidit￿tsbedarf haben, e￿ektiv dem Umverteilungsmechanismus entziehen, indem sie
ihre Einlagen abziehen und in alternative Anlagen investieren. Dementsprechend nimmt
die durch den Einlagenvertrag erm￿glichte Liquidit￿tsversicherung ab, wenn der Wettbe-
werb zwischen Bankeinlagen und alternativen kapitalmarktorientierten Anlagen steigt.
2Siehe zum Beispiel die IWF-Studie "Germany’s Three-Pillar Banking System: Cross-Country Per-
spectives in Europe".In einem Finanzsystem, in dem die Marktmacht der Banken im Einlagengesch￿ft
durch den Wettbewerb mit alternativen Investitionsformen begrenzt wird, ist eine Re-
duktion der Marktmacht durch eine Intensivierung dieses Wettbewerbs mit den Kosten
einer verringerten Liquidit￿tsversicherung in der ￿konomie verbunden. Im Gegensatz
dazu f￿hrt der Wettbewerb zwischen Banken nicht zu derartigen negativen Wohlfahrtsef-
fekten. Ein intensiverer Wettbewerb zwischen Banken reduziert nicht die E￿zienz der
Liquidit￿tsversicherung des Einlagenvertrags. Da der Einlagenvertrag aller Banken den
gleichen optimalen Grad an Liquidit￿tsversicherung impliziert, erm￿glicht ein intensiverer
Wettbewerb zwischen Banken nicht, dass sich Haushalte ohne unmittelbaren Liquidit￿ts-
bedarf e￿zienter dem Umverteilungsmechanismus der Liquidit￿tsversicherung entziehen
k￿nnen.
Die vorliegende Studie deutet demnach daraufhin, dass eine Reduktion der Monopol-
renten von Banken durch einen intensivierten Wettbewerb zwischen Banken zu einer
h￿heren Wohlfahrt f￿hrt als eine Begrenzung der Monopolrenten durch einen verst￿rkten
Wettbewerb von alternativen marktorientierten Anlageformen. W￿hrend die Begrenzung
der Monopolrenten und der damit verbundenen Ine￿zienzen demnach in einem Finanzsys-
tem, das durch einen starken Wettbewerb zwischen Banken und alternativen Investitionen
gepr￿gt ist, mit Wohlfahrtseinbu￿en verbunden ist, gilt dies nicht unbedingt f￿r ein Fi-
nanzsystem wie dem deutschen, in dem der Wettbewerb im Finanzsektor vor allem durch
den Wettbewerb zwischen Banken gepr￿gt ist.
Dar￿ber hinaus zeigt die Analyse, dass der verbesserte Zugang von privaten Haushal-
ten zu kapitalmarktorientierten Anlageformen in Deutschland negative Wohlfahrtse￿ekte
mit sich gebracht haben d￿rfte. In einem Finanzsystem, wie dem US-amerikanischen, das
bereits historisch besonders von einem intensiven Wettbewerb von Banken und alterna-
tiven Anlageformen gepr￿gt war, k￿nnte diese Entwicklung dagegen durchaus auch posi-
tive Wohlfahrtsimplikationen gehabt haben. Im US-amerikanischen Finanzsystem d￿rfte
der verbesserte Finanzmarktzugang privater Haushalte zwar einerseits die Liquidit￿tsver-
sicherung der Einlagenvertr￿ge reduziert haben. Anderseits hat aber der verst￿rkte Wett-
bewerb mit marktorientierten Anlageformen zu einer Verringerung der Monopolmacht
der Banken und der hieraus erwachsenden Ine￿zienzen gef￿hrt. In Deutschland dage-
gen waren die Monopolrenten bereits stark durch den Wettbewerb zwischen Banken re-
stringiert. Eine zus￿tzliche Versch￿rfung des Wettbewerbs durch den verbesserten Finanz-
marktzugang vermindert hier mithin nur die Liquidit￿tsversicherung, die durch Bankein-
lagen bereitgestellt werden kann.
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1 Introduction
In the discussion about di￿erences between ￿nancial systems Germany is usually viewed as
the most prominent example of a system in which banks play the central role in channelling
funds from households to investing ￿rms. Banks typically collect funds issuing sight, time,
and saving deposits and provide these funds as loans to the corporate sector. In contrast
to more market-oriented ￿nancial systems, direct investments in the corporate sector play
a minor role in households’ portfolios. At the same time only a few corporations issue
tradable bonds to raise funds directly over the capital market.
However, in recent years the German ￿nancial system has undergone many remarkable
changes. The most remarkable one has probably been in the re￿nancing of German banks.
While in 1991 a fraction of around 46% of German households’ portfolio was invested in
bank deposits (including currency), this portfolio fraction dropped to 36% in 2003 which
is, however, still far larger than the 15% that U.S. households hold in currency and bank
deposits. Due to technological progress and innovation in the ￿nancial service industry,
households’ access to ￿nancial markets became more e￿cient. The privatization of large
public enterprizes also created a large supply of corporate claims in the ￿nancial market.
Finally the introduction of the euro created a more liquid ￿nancial market for corporate
stocks and corporate bonds making these ￿nancial assets more attractive to households. 1
Thus banks compete for households’ funds with direct investments and more ￿nancial
market-related intermediaries, such as money market funds, to a much larger extent today
than they had to at the beginning of the nineties.
At the same time the competition among banks for households’ deposits has always
been more intense in the German bank-dominated ￿nancial system than in more market-
oriented ￿nancial systems like those of the U.S. and UK. This is re￿ected, for instance, in
the number of banking institutions which in 2003 amounted to 2,225 in Germany compared
with 426 in the UK. More importantly, the Her￿ndahl index for total assets as a measure
∗Fecht: Economics Department, Deutsche Bundesbank, Wilhelm-Epstein-Strasse 14, 60431 Frankfurt
am Main, Germany. Martin: Research and Statistics Department, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 33
Liberty Street, New York, NY 10045, USA. We thank Diemo Dietrich, Phil Dybvig, Hans Peter Gr￿ner,
Elu von Thadden, Wolf Wagner as well as seminar participants at the Bundesbank, at the University
of Mannheim, at the University of Tilburg, at the 3rd Workshop on Monetary and Financial Economics
in Halle. All remaining errors are our own. The views expressed here are those of the authors and not
necessarily those of the Deutsche Bundesbank, the Federal Reserve of New York, or the Federal Reserve
System.
1See Deutsche Bundesbank (2000) for a detailed discussion of the interaction between bank lending
and the bond market in Germany.
1of concentration in the national banking industry only reached 173 in Germany in 2003
￿ the lowest in the European Union where the average Her￿ndahl index amounted to
541.2
Due to the more return-oriented investment behavior of households the competition
among banks for households’ funds has still intensi￿ed in recent years. The market share
of direct banks that mainly o￿er sight deposit that pay an interest rate closely linked to
the money market rates has increased from about 4% in 1999 to more than 12% in 2004.
This high and still intensifying degree of competition among banks and the increased
competition between banks on the one side and ￿nancial markets and market-related
￿nancial intermediaries on the other has eroded the pro￿tability of the German banking
sector signi￿cantly in recent years. 3
This paper analyzes in a theoretical model the welfare implications of these develop-
ments. We address the question of whether an increasing ￿nancial market access of private
households improves welfare in a ￿nancial system in which banks compete intensely for
private households’ funds. We compare these implications with the welfare e￿ects of an
improved ￿nancial market access of households in a ￿nancial system with less intense
competition among banks for households’ deposits. In our model, regional monopolistic
banks o￿er deposit contracts to local households. As in Diamond and Dybvig (1983) these
deposit contracts provide liquidity insurance to households that face uncertain intertem-
poral consumption preferences. But similar to Diamond (1997) and Fecht (2004) the
degree of liquidity insurance that deposit contracts can o￿er is restrained by households’
￿nancial market access. Liquidity insurance implies an ex post redistribution of resources
from patient depositors to impatient depositors. Financial market access provides patient
depositors with an ex post option to withdraw from this insurance scheme. Thus an
improvement of households’ ￿nancial market access limits the degree of risk sharing that
banks’ deposit contracts can provide. However, in contrast to previous approaches, in
our model banks have local monopoly power that allows them to earn a monopoly rent. 4
We assume that these rents are associated with welfare losses. This might be viewed,
for instance, as a shortcut for the managerial moral hazard that arises in the relation-
ship between the equity owners of the bank and the bank management. The higher the
monopoly rents of banks (and the lower therefore the debt-equity ratio) the more severe
2Data taken from European Central Bank (2004). For a more detailed analysis of measures of the
degree of competition in the German banking industry see Fischer and Pfeil (2004).
3See Deutsche Bundesbank (2004) and International Monetary Fund (2003) for a more detailed dis-
cussion.
4See von Thadden (1999) for a detailed survey of the various approaches that allow for a coexistence
of a ￿nancial market and a deposit taking bank that provides liquidity insurance.
2becomes this moral hazard problem and the higher the associated ine￿ciencies. 5 Since an
improved ￿nancial market access of households reduces the monopoly rent it also limits
managerial moral hazard at banks. Consequently, a trade-o￿ emerges: households’ im-
proved ￿nancial market access reduces risk-sharing in the economy but at the same time
limits the e￿ciency losses resulting from banks’ monopoly rents. We derive the optimal
degree of ￿nancial market access that optimizes this trade-o￿.
However, the results change if the monopoly power of regional banks is also limited
by households’ option to deposit their funds at a cost with a bank from another region.
As soon as the monopoly rent of local banks is su￿ciently restrained by the competition
between banks, the welfare improving e￿ect of increased ￿nancial market access becomes
obsolete. In that case improved ￿nancial market access only limits the degree of risk-
sharing o￿ered by banks’ deposit contracts.
Thus our results suggest that a more e￿cient ￿nancial market access of households
might improve welfare in a ￿nancial system that is characterized by an insu￿cient com-
petition for deposits among banks. In contracts, in a ￿nancial system with a strong com-
petition for households’ deposits among banks, more e￿cient ￿nancial market access only
reduces welfare by restraining the available risk-sharing in the economy. Consequently,
while in the U.S. and the UK, which are characterized by a less competitive banking
sectors, a high level of households participation in the ￿nancial market may be bene￿cial,
households’ improved ￿nancial market access in Germany, which is characterized by a
strong competition for deposits among banks, might be welfare reducing.
Apart from Diamond (1997) there are only very few papers that analyze the inter-
play between competition in the ￿nancial sector for households’ funds and the liquidity
insurance provided by banks’ deposit contracts. Von Thadden (1997) introduces in the
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) framework an additional long-term asset that has a di￿erent
term structure ￿ i.e., a di￿erent maturity risk. He shows that if banks’ deposit contracts
can provide households with more insurance against maturity risk than direct investments,
then deposit contracts can also o￿er some degree of liquidity insurance even if households
have a perfectly e￿cient access to ￿nancial markets. Extending the model to continuous
time von Thadden (1998) shows that if households are su￿ciently risk averse then the
persisting demand for maturity risk insurance enables banks to o￿er incentive-compatible
deposit contracts that provide the optimal degree of liquidity insurance even if households
can e￿ciently invest directly in the ￿nancial market. While providing a very detailed fo-
cus on the e￿ect of competition between banks and direct ￿nancial market investments
on liquidity provision all these approaches assume a perfectly competitive banking sector.
In contrast, Carletti, Hartmann, and Spagnolo (2003) analyze the e￿ect of bank mergers
5See Harris and Raviv (1990) and Aghion and Bolton (1992) who model the disciplining role of debt.
3on liquidity provision. They show that a bank merger (due to the economies of scale in
liquidity provision) will increase aggregate liquidity if ex post re￿nancing in the interbank
market is expensive relative to ex ante ￿nancing through deposits. However, in their pa-
per changes in competition only relate to an intensifying competition in the loan market.
They neither analyze the aggregate liquidity e￿ect of an increasing competition among
banks for deposits nor do they study the impact of an intensifying competition between
banks and ￿nancial market investments on the liquidity provision. Thus in contrast to
previous studies our paper takes both the competition between banks and ￿nancial mar-
kets as well as the competition within the banking sector for deposits into account and
analyzes its impact on liquidity provision and ultimately welfare.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic set up.
In section 3 we ￿rst derive the optimal ￿nancial market access given that banks are local
monopolists. In section 4 we also allow for competition among bank from di￿erent region.
In section 5 we derive the optimal ￿nancial structure for a given degree of competition
from the market and from other banks. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
The economy consists of N regions and takes place at three dates, denoted by t = 0, 1,
and 2. Each region contains one bank and a continuum of mass 1 of households. There is
also a large number of entrepreneurs. Households are endowed with one unit of the only
consumption good in the economy at date 0. They can deposit their endowment with
the local bank or with a bank from another region. Households can also invest directly
at a centralized ￿nancial market. Each bank o￿ers a deposit contract and maximizes its
pro￿ts. Entrepreneurs operate a long-term technology as described below.
There are two technologies in this economy. The storage technology returns 1 unit
of goods at date t, for each unit invested at t − 1, t = 1,2. The long-term technology
is operated by the entrepreneurs. It has a high potential return but is subject to moral
hazard. The long-term technology returns R units of goods at date 2 for each unit invested
at date 0, provided the entrepreneur operating the technology is monitored at date 1. If
the entrepreneur is not monitored, the return is only γR at date 2, with γR < 1. The
long-term technology can also be liquidated at date 1, in which case it returns r < 1.







monitored −1 0 R
unmonitored −1 0 γ · R
If liquidated −1 r 0
Banks are able to costlessly monitor entrepreneurs at date 1. Households can also
monitor entrepreneurs, but only if they become sophisticated. In order to become so-
phisticated, a household must pay a proportional utility cost denoted by χ.6 Households
choose whether or not to become sophisticated at date 0, after observing the deposit
contracts o￿ered by banks.
At date 1, households learn whether they are patient or impatient. Patient households
only derive utility from consuming at date 1, while impatient households only derive utility
from consuming at date 2. The probability of being impatient is denoted by q. We assume
a law of large number holds so that q also denotes the fraction of impatient households
in the economy. The expected utility of a household from consuming ct with t = 1,2 can
thus be written as
U (c1,c2) =
(
u(c1) with probability q
u(c2) with probability 1 − q
(1)




χ · u(c1) with probability q
χ · u(c2) with probability 1 − q
(2)
where χ denotes the disutility from the e￿ort required to become sophisticated. Similarly,
if a households prefers to deposit the endowment with a bank from another region its
expected utility is discounted by µ, re￿ecting the disutility due to the additional e￿ort
that has to be spend in that case. The intratemporal utility function is assumed to display
constant relative risk aversion: u(ct) = 1
1−αc
1−α
t , with α > 1.7
6While assuming a proportional cost simpli￿es the exposition, we conjecture that modelling the cost
di￿erently would yield qualitatively similar results. Assuming a resource cost instead of a utility cost
yields similar results as shown in Fecht, Huang, and Martin (2004).
7Note that because the utility function is a negative function µ,χ > 1. A higher number means more
disutility.
5Banks o￿er households a deposit contract. A deposit contract speci￿es the repayment
d1 that depositors receive if they withdraw their funds in t = 1 and the repayment d2 that
those depositors receive that keep their deposits until date 2.
Before banks decide about the deposit contracts, the right to run the di￿erent regional
banks has to be allocated. There are B potential bank managers with B > N. They
compete for the licences to run a regional bank. The bank managers that can credibly
promise to distribute the highest pro￿t to the households in the economy receive a licence.
Bank managers can only realize the maximum feasible pro￿t Π if they expend some e￿ort.
Without e￿ort, the monopoly rent will only amount to δΠ with δ < 1. The actual e￿ort
expended by the bank manager is not veri￿able and therefore cannot be required in a
contract. Bank managers’ disutility from e￿ort is assumed to be always higher than the
utility from keeping a fraction (1−δ) of the pro￿ts. Consequently, the maximum pro￿t of
local banks that can be credibly promised to households and that will actually be realized
is δΠ.8
3 Monopolistic banking system
In this section we study the problem of a monopolistic bank. We assume that the local
bank does not compete with other banks for depositors; i.e., µ = ∞. The local bank’s
monopoly position is only challenged by the ability of households to invest directly in the
centralized ￿nancial market.
3.1 The pro￿t maximizing deposit contract
The deposit contract {d1;d2} o￿ered by the bank maximizes pro￿ts subject to a number
of constraints.9 First, the deposit contract must ensure that households prefer to deposit
their funds with the bank rather than investing in the storage technology if they decide
to stay na￿ve. Let M denote wealth of a household at date 0, which is given by the
household’s endowment as well as the value of its share of the bank’s pro￿ts: M = 1+δΠ.
8There are several other explanations why monopoly rents might lead to ine￿ciencies and why the
pro￿ts cannot be distributed entirely to household. For instance, we could relate this managerial moral
hazard problem to the return on the long-term investment technology and assume that only a certain
fraction of R would be realized if bank managers did not spend their full e￿ort. This would probably
be more convincing but would complicate the analysis without qualitatively changing the result. More-
over, there are several other explanations for the ine￿ciencies that we assume to be associated with the
monopoly rent of banks and the debt-equity relation. See, for instance, Harris and Raviv (1990) and
Aghion and Bolton (1992).
9As usual in this kind of model there are multiple equilibria. Our paper focuses on the good equilibrium
and leaves the study of bank panics in this context to future research.
6Thus this participation constraint, denoted by (PCN), is given by
qu(d1) + (1 − q)u(d2) ≥ u(M). (3)
In addition, the optimal deposit contract must also provide an incentive for households
not to become sophisticated and invest directly at the ￿nancial market. The arbitrage-free
price in the centralized ￿nancial market in t = 1 of a claim against the corporate sector
that pays R in t = 2 is always 1.10 Consequently, the constraint that households remain
na￿ve, denoted by (PCS), can be written as
qu(d1) + (1 − q)u(d2) ≥ χqu(M) + χ(1 − q)u(RM). (4)
Note that, in principle, sophisticated households could also deposit their wealth in the
bank at date 0, withdraw at date 1, and invest d1 in the ￿nancial market if they turn out
to be patient. Sophisticated households would choose this option if
χqu(M) + χ(1 − q)u(RM) < χqu(d1) + χ(1 − q)u(Rd1), (5)
which obviously only holds if d1 > M. As shown in the Appendix, the monopolistic
deposit contract always satis￿es d1 ≤ M, so (PCS) is the relevant constraint.11
For the sake of completeness, we include the incentive compatibility constraint d1 ≤ M
in the problem below and denote it by (ICS).
The pro￿t maximizing deposit contract is also subject to another incentive compatibil-
ity constraints, denoted by (ICN), which ensures that na￿ve households will not withdraw
if they turn out to be patient. This is the case if d2 ≥ d1. This constraint never binds.











We denote by {dm
1 ;dm
2 } the deposit contract that solves (P1).
Comparing (PCS) and (PCN) shows that if the cost χ of becoming sophisticated is
above the threshold level
¯ χ =
1
q + (1 − q) · R1−α,
10See Fecht (2004) for a detailed explanation.
11So in the present paper sophisticated households never invest in deposits that they withdraw to buy
claims against the corporate sector in the ￿nancial market if they turn out to be patient. This contrast
to the equilibrium in Fecht, Huang, and Martin (2004) results from the assumptions in the present paper
that banks are regional monopolists and o￿er their deposit contract before households decide whether to
become sophisticated or not.
7households stay na￿ve even if they plan to invest directly in either technology (see Ap-
pendix for the derivation of ¯ χ). In that case, (PCN) is the only binding constraint. If
χ ≤ ¯ χ, na￿ve households do not invest in the centralized ￿nancial market and (PCN) is




, where χ is given by
χ =
q + (1 − q) · R(1−α)/α
q + (1 − q) · R1−α ,
then d1 < M and the optimal deposit contract maximizes pro￿ts subject to (PCS) only
(details of the derivation of χ are provided in the appendix). If the cost of becoming




, then d1 = M and (ICS) holds with
equality.
We derive the deposit contract o￿ered by the bank for each case in turn. If χ ∈ [¯ χ,∞)




















The degree of risk-sharing provided by this contract is dm
2 = R1/αdm
1 . It can be shown
that this is the optimal degree of risk-sharing that would also be provided by a social
planner. Since this contract is independent of χ, the monopolist deposit contract is the
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The degree of risk-sharing provided by this contract is also dm
2 = R1/αdm
1 . It is easy to




. However, the level
of the repayment on deposit contracts o￿ered by the monopolistic bank changes with χ
in that interval.



















Indeed, the contract is determined by d1 = M and
q · u(M) + (1 − q) · u(d2) = χ[q · u(M) + (1 − q) · u(R · M)].
The degree of risk-sharing o￿ered by this contract is
Θ =









a decrease in χ not only increases the average repayments to
households, and therefore their expected utility, but also changes the degree of liquidity
insurance, Θ, provided by the deposit contract.
We can summarize the e￿ect of a change in the cost of becoming a sophisticated
investor in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 For χ < ¯ χ a reduction in the cost of becoming a sophisticated investor
improves the outside option of households vis-Æ-vis the monopolistic bank. Therefore the
bank increases the repayment level on deposits. However, if χ < χ a reduction in the
cost of becoming sophisticated constrains the degree of risk-sharing that is provided by the
deposit contract.
3.2 Equilibrium monopoly rent and households’ wealth
The monopoly rent a bank could realize at maximum with the full e￿ort of the bank
manager is given by




For di￿erent values of χ, we can substitute the relevant value of d1 and d2 in this equation
to obtain an expression for the maximum realizable pro￿ts.
Once again, we consider each case in turn. If χ ∈ [¯ χ,∞) the monopoly rent is















q + (1 − q)R
(1−α)/αα/(α−1)
M, (9)
with details provided in the Appendix. Not surprisingly, in this interval the monopoly





the monopoly rent is given by
Π = (1 − A






q + (1 − q)R
1−α 1
1−α ,
with details provided in the Appendix. In this interval a reduction in χ leads to a higher
level of repayments on the deposit contract which brings about a lower monopoly rent.










with details are provided in the Appendix. In this interval also, a decrease in χ increased
the outside option of households, forcing the bank to increase the level of repayment on
the deposit contract. It is thus not surprising that a decrease in χ reduces the monopoly
rent in this case as well.
We can state the following proposition.
Proposition 2 If χ < ¯ χ, in which case becoming sophisticated and investing directly in
the ￿nancial market is the relevant alternative for households, a decrease in χ reduces the
monopoly rent of banks.
As noted above, the wealth of each household is given by its endowment￿normalized
to 1￿and the payout of the actual pro￿ts δΠ the bank manager realizes without expending
e￿ort. Hence,
M = 1 + δΠ. (10)
For di￿erent values of χ, inserting the relevant value of Π into the above equation yields
the households’ equilibrium wealth.











households’ initial wealth is given by
M =
1
1 − δ(1 − Aα · B · χ−1/(α−1))
.
Obviously, given the participation of households in the pro￿ts of the banks, lower pro￿ts
due to lower costs of becoming sophisticated reduce the initial wealth of households.
Similarly, in the case where χ ∈ [1,χ) reducing monopoly rents lowers the households’












We can now state the following proposition.
Proposition 3 If χ < ¯ χ, in which case becoming sophisticated and investing directly in
the ￿nancial market is the relevant alternative for households, a decrease in χ reduces the
initial wealth of households.
103.3 Households’ welfare and the optimal χ
In this section, we ￿nd the value of χ, denoted by χ∗, that maximizes the expected






Clearly, χ∗ does not belong to [¯ χ,∞), since this interval provides the lowest expected
utility for households. In this case, χ is so large that becoming sophisticated in order to
invest directly in the ￿nancial market is not a relevant alternative for households. Indeed,
for such high values of χ a household invests only in the storage technology. Changes in
the value of χ in this interval a￿ect neither the deposit contract, nor the monopoly rent,





a reduction in χ improves the outside option of households by
increasing the expected utility received from direct investments in the ￿nancial market.
Therefore, the monopolistic bank has to increase the repayment on the deposit contract,
improving households’ expected utility. On the other hand, a higher repayment on de-
posits squeezes the monopoly rent of banks and, thereby, reduces households’ wealth. The
￿rst e￿ect always dominates so that a decrease in χ increases households’ expected utility.
To see that, note in this case the expected utility of a household is given by
E [U (d1;d2)] =
 









q + (1 − q)R
1−α M2−α
α − 1
(1 − δ) < 0, (12)
with details provided in the Appendix. Consequently, reducing the costs of becoming
an e￿cient investor is always welfare improving in that interval because it reduces the
monopoly rent of banks and thereby limits the ine￿ciencies associated with these rents.




. In that case a second e￿ect goes against
the e￿ciency gains arising from reducing the monopoly rent. Indeed, for such low levels
of χ the liquidity insurance provided by the deposit contract worsens as χ decreases,
reducing the households’ welfare. Consequently a trade-o￿ emerges between these two
e￿ects and the optimal value of χ must balance both costs. To see this, note that the
expected utility of households in this case is
E [U] =





To solve for the optimal value of χ, we ￿rst ￿nd the value of Θ which maximizes house-














11The expressions for the initial wealth of households and its derivative are given by
M =
1






[1 − δ(1 − q)(1 − R−1Θ)]
2.



















(1 − q)R(1−α) + q
. (15)
Now we can state the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Improving ￿nancial market access of households is not necessarily welfare
enhancing. If χ ∈ [¯ χ,∞] changing χ does not a￿ect welfare. If χ ∈ [1,χ∗] a reduction
in χ strictly decreases welfare. Only in the case χ ∈ [χ∗, ¯ χ] does a decrease in χ increase
welfare. In that case, reducing the ine￿ciencies due to the monopoly rents dominates the
cost of reducing the risk-sharing provided by the equilibrium deposit contract.
Figure 1 depicts the expected utility received by a household under the monopolist
deposit contract (the ￿gure assumes R = 3, q = 0.3, α = 2, and δ = 0.8) .
In the remainder of this section we provide conditions under which χ∗ is an interior
solution; i.e., χ > χ∗ > 1. Inserting the equilibrium expression for χ and χ∗, respectively,
and rearranging yields
1 > δ >
1
qR1/(α−1) + (1 − q)
(16)
(details are provided in the Appendix).
Whenever there are some ine￿ciencies associated with the monopoly power of banks
(δ < 1), χ∗ should be smaller than χ because limiting the monopoly power at the expense





Hence, the optimal value of χ decreases as the ine￿ciencies due to the monopoly rent
increase. However, if these ine￿ciencies become too severe χ∗ will attain the lower bound
χ∗ = 1. This constraint binds whenever δ > 1
qR1/(α−1)+(1−q).
We can summarize these ￿ndings in the following proposition.
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Figure 1 
Figure 1 depicts the expected utility received by a household under the monop-
olist deposit contract (the ﬁgure assumes R = 3, q = 0.3, α = 2, and δ = 0.8).
In the remainder of this section we provide conditions under which χ∗ is an
interior solution; i.e., χ > χ∗ > 1. Inserting the equilibrium expression for χ and
χ∗, respectively, and rearranging yields
1 > δ >
1
qR1/(α−1) + (1 − q)
(16)
(details are provided in the Appendix).
Whenever there are some ineﬃciencies associated with the monopoly power of
banks (δ < 1), χ∗ should be smaller than χ because limiting the monopoly power
at the expense of some liquidity insurance is welfare improving. It can be seen from




Hence, the optimal value of χ decreases as the ineﬃciencies due to the monopoly
rent increase. However, if these ineﬃciencies become too severe χ∗ will attain the
lower bound χ∗ = 1. This constraint binds whenever δ > 1
qR1/(α−1)+(1−q).
We can summarize these ﬁndings in the following proposition.
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Proposition 5 If there are some ine￿ciencies associated with monopoly power, the cost
to become sophisticated should be reduced to χ∗ < χ to limit these ine￿ciencies even
though this reduces risk-sharing. The optimal cost of becoming sophisticated decreases as
the ine￿ciencies due to the monopoly power increase.
4 Monopolistically competitive banking system
In this section, we relax the assumption that µ = ∞. If µ is su￿ciently low, each regional
bank must be concerned that local households might deposit their wealth in the bank of
another region. We assume that households can only deposit money in either bank at
t = 0. In t = 1 households can only invest over the centralized ￿nancial market. Thus if
banks want to raise funds in t = 1 they have to issue bank bonds. Just like in the case
of bonds issued by the non-￿nancial corporate sector ￿ households can only e￿ciently
invest in these bank bonds if they spend the utility cost χ to become sophisticated.12
12This assumption re￿ects the argument put forward in Diamond and Rajan (2001) that a deposit
contract only provides a credible disciplining device of the borrower because of the threat that lenders
withdraw on an unexpectedly large scale if the borrower misbehaves. If a deposit contract incorporates
no such option￿because it is due after one period anyway￿it is subject to the same ine￿ciencies as other
￿nancial claims against the corporate sector.
Note that if we would assume that banks could also raise one-period deposits in t = 1, non-local banks
could o￿er one-period deposits in t = 1 promising for each unit deposited a repayment smaller but close
to R in t = 2. This would be bene￿cial for non-local banks because it provides them with liquidity at a
134.1 The non-local deposit contract
We assume that there is at least one bank, called the non-local bank, which does not have
any depositors in its region. This bank will have depositors only if it can attract them from
other regions. The contract o￿ered by the non-local bank is the outside option against
which local banks￿those that do have depositors in their region￿must compete. 13
Because of competition between banks, the non-local bank o￿ers a deposit contract
which maximizes the utility of depositors, subject to some constraints. First, since it
has no depositors in its region, the non-local bank makes zero pro￿ts. Hence this bank’s
budget constraint, denoted by (BC), is given by




Also, it can be veri￿ed that the constraints (PCN) and (ICN) never bind.
If χ > 1, the deposit contract o￿ered by the non-local bank will provide some risk-
sharing. This implies d1 > M. In that case, as noted in the previous section, sophisticated
households deposit their wealth in the bank and withdraw at date 1 whether or not they
turn out to be impatient. Hence, the relevant constraint providing incentives for depositors
to remain na￿ve is (PC0
S), or
qu(d1) + (1 − q)u(d2) ≥ χqu(d1) + χ(1 − q)u(Rd1). (18)








qu(d1) + (1 − q)u(d2)
s.t. (BC),(PC0
S).








q + (1 − q)Γ · R−1;
Γ · M
q + (1 − q)Γ · R−1

.











lower cost than investing in the storage technology in t = 0. If households utility costs of switching to a
non-local bank in t = 1 is su￿ciently low then they will indeed withdraw their funds from their regional
bank and deposit them at the non-local bank. In order to prevent this, regional banks have to limit the
degree of risk-sharing provided by their initial deposit contract. Thus allowing to switch deposits from
the local to a non-local bank in t = 1 at a cost has the same e￿ect as the secondary ￿nancial market
access of households described in the previous section.
13Alternatively, we could assume that banks can distinguish between depositors from their region and
depositors from other regions. The deposit contract o￿ered to depositors from other regions would be
the same as the deposit contract derived in this section.
14where Θ is de￿ned in equation (6).
If χ > χ, then (PC0
S) is not binding. In that case the contract o￿ered by the non-local
bank is the same as the contract a planner would o￿er since it maximizes depositors’
utility subject to (BC), which in this case is equivalent to a resource constraint. If χ < χ,
then the deposit contract is given by the intersection of (PC0
S) and (BC). Because
(PC0
S) is binding, the contract cannot implement the socially optimal risk-sharing in this
case. Thus, whenever χ < χ the option of households to become sophisticated, withdraw
their deposits in t = 1, and invest them in the secondary ￿nancial market prevents the
non-local bank from o￿ering a deposit contract that implements the e￿cient degree of
risk-sharing. Further, as immediately follows from the de￿nition of Θ, a lower cost of
becoming sophisticated reduces risk-sharing (i.e., increases Θ).
As will be shown in the next section, if µ is su￿ciently small, so that the deposit
contract o￿ered by the non-local bank constrains the contract o￿ered by local banks,
then the agent’s wealth, M, is independent of χ. Hence, a decrease in risk-sharing will
imply a lower utility for depositors. We can now state the following proposition.
Proposition 6 The equilibrium deposit contract o￿ered by the non-local bank is not af-








then the risk-sharing provided by the
equilibrium deposit contract decreases as χ decreases.
4.2 The local deposit contract
When µ is ￿nite, local banks must potentially take into account the competition from
the non-local bank. If µ is su￿ciently high, the local bank will still be able to o￿er the
contract derived in section 3. However, if µ is low then the local bank must o￿er a contract
which provides incentives for depositors in its region not to invest in the non-local bank.
This constraint, which we denote (PCC), can be written as
qu(d1) + (1 − q)u(d2) ≥ µqu(d
∗
1) + µ(1 − q)u(d
∗
2). (20)
It is easy to see that if (PCC) binds then d1 > M. Hence the local bank also faces the
constraint (PC0




























15Note that if both (PCC) and (PC0
S) bind, then the deposit contract is given by the
intersection of these two constraints holding at equality.
If µ decreases, the repayment to households from the contract o￿ered by their local
bank obviously increases. A reduction in χ does not a￿ect the repayment on the deposit




because in that case (PC0





a decrease in χ leads to a decrease in the degree of risk-sharing, a decrease
in d1, and an increase in d2.
For a given χ, there exists a threshold value for µ such that if µ is above that threshold
then the regional bank o￿ers the monopolist deposit contract derived in section 3 and
denoted by {dm
1 ;dm
2 }. However, if µ is below the threshold value, then the local bank
o￿ers the contract {dc
1;dc
2} derived in this section. The threshold value of µ, denoted by
¯ µ is the one that makes depositors indi￿erent between the two contracts.
If χ ∈ [1,χ), then dm








q + (1 − q)ΘR−1
and dc
2 = Θdc
1. It follows that U (dm
1 ,dm
2 ) = U (dc
1,dc
2) if and only if dm
1 = dc




q + (1 − q)ΘR
−11−α . (21)





2) if and only if dm
1 = dc




, this condition implies
¯ µ = χ
q + (1 − q)R1−α
h




If χ > ¯ χ, this same condition implies
¯ µ =
h





Whenever χ > ¯ χ, the threshold value of µ is independent of χ. This is not surprising
since neither the deposit contract {dm
1 ;dm
2 } nor {dc
1;dc
2} depend on χ. When χ ≤ ¯ χ, ¯ µ
increases as χ increases.
Thus ¯ µ is a weakly increasing function of the costs χ of becoming a sophisticated
investor. If the costs of investing e￿ciently in the ￿nancial markets are high then the
non-local banks can o￿er a more e￿cient deposit contract. Consequently, the costs of
depositing at a non-local bank µ must be higher to leave the deposit contract of a mo-
nopolistic local bank unconstraint by the competition of non-local banks.
Figure 1 shows ¯ µ as a function of χ (this ￿gure assumes R = 3, q = 0.3, and α = 2).
We can summarize our ￿ndings in the following proposition:
16Proposition 7 Whenever µ < ¯ µ, for a given χ, the deposit contract o￿ered by local banks
is constrained by the competition with the non-local bank. In that case changes of χ have









). The cuto￿ ¯ µ increases
(weakly) with χ.
4.3 Equilibrium monopoly rent and households’ wealth
To ￿nd banks’ pro￿ts when competition between local and non-local banks is a binding
constraint, we can substitute dc
1 and dc











1 − δ (1 − µ−1/(α−1))
. (24)
From (24) we can immediately derive the following proposition.
Proposition 8 Whenever competition among banks is binding ( µ < ¯ µ, for a given χ) M
is independent of χ. Changes in χ do not a￿ect the ine￿ciencies related to the monopoly
rent of banks.
4.4 Households’ welfare and the e￿ect of χ
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2/(1−α)1−α  
q + (1 − q)R
(1−α)/αα
.
This is the households’ welfare in the case where competition between banks limits local
banks’ monopoly power, but direct ￿nancial market access does not restrain the risk-
sharing provided by the equilibrium deposit contract. It is easy to see that in this case
a change in χ does not have any welfare e￿ect. A decrease in µ, however, reduces the
monopoly power of local banks and thereby limits the monopoly rents and the ine￿ciencies
associated with these rents. The higher these ine￿ciencies (the lower δ) the more bene￿cial





then the local banks’ equilibrium deposit contract is not only constrained
by competition with non-local banks. The ￿nancial market access of households also
restrains the equilibrium contract in that it limits the degree of risk-sharing the contract
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> 0, it is easy to see that households’ expected utility decreases strictly when
the cost of becoming sophisticated decreases. As long as the monopoly rent is determined
by the competition between the local and non-local banks, rather than by the competition
between banks and markets, a more e￿cient ￿nancial market access of households only
limits the risk-sharing that the deposit contract provides.
Proposition 9 Whenever for a given χ, µ > ¯ µ improving ￿nancial market access of
households (lowering χ) is not welfare improving. In that case competition among banks
e￿ciently restrains banks’ monopoly rents. Lower costs of becoming sophisticated have








), because they reduce
the available risk-sharing in the economy.
Figure 2 depicts the expected utility received by a household under the monopolist
deposit contract, as well as the competitive deposit contract for two di￿erent values of
µ. (the ￿gure assumes R = 3, q = 0.3,α = 2, and δ = 0.8).Graphically, an increase in µ
simply lowers the curve showing the expected utility provided by the competitive deposit
contract.
5 The globally optimal ￿nancial market access
In the two previous sections we have shown that in an economy in which the banking
system is not su￿ciently competitive there is an optimal cost of ￿nancial market access for
households that trades o￿ the welfare improving reduction of banks’ monopoly rent versus
the ine￿ciencies due to suboptimal risk-sharing. If the banking system is su￿ciently
competitive, welfare is maximized if households have no e￿cient access to ￿nancial market,
because in these economies the option of households to invest in the ￿nancial market only
limits the risk-sharing the deposit contract o￿ers. Ine￿ciencies due to banks’ monopoly
rents are limited by the competition among banks and not by the ￿nancial market access
of households. Consequently, in these economies increasing households’ costs of accessing
the ￿nancial market always improved welfare. In this section we address the question
of how intense competition between banks has to be for a competitive banking sector
without e￿cient ￿nancial market access of households to be preferable to a monopolistic
banking sector with the optimal degree of ￿nancial market access of households.
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Figure 2 
ket access for households that trades oﬀ the welfare improving reduction of banks’
monopoly rent versus the ineﬃciencies due to suboptimal risk-sharing. If the bank-
ing system is suﬃciently competitive, welfare is maximized if households have no eﬃ-
cient access to ﬁnancial market, because in these economies the option of households
to invest in the ﬁnancial market only limits the risk-sharing the deposit contract
oﬀers. Ineﬃciencies due to banks’ monopoly rents are limited by the competition
among banks and not by the ﬁnancial market access of households. Consequently, in
these economies increasing households’ costs of accessing the ﬁnancial market always
improved welfare. In this section we address the question of how intense competition
between banks has to be for a competitive banking sector without eﬃcient ﬁnancial
market access of households to be preferable to a monopolistic banking sector with
the optimal degree of ﬁnancial market access of households.
As shown above, the highest expected utility households can obtain from a mo-
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When banks are competing with each other, the highest expected utility households
can obtain from their local bank, given µ, is achieved for χ ≥ χ. The expected utility
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.
The threshold µ below which households are better o￿ in a competitive banking system
without ￿nancial market access than in a system with monopolistic banks and an optimal
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19and is given by
µ =
   
q + (1 − q)(Θ∗)
1−α1/(α−1)






Thus we can state the following proposition.
Proposition 10 If the costs of switching to non-local banks are su￿ciently small ( µ <
µ,µ) in the competitive banking system, then the competitive banking system without e￿-
cient ￿nancial market access ( χ ≥ χ) of households is more e￿cient than a monopolistic
banking system (µ > µ) with the optimal costs of accessing the ￿nancial market ( χ = χ∗).
6 Conclusion
In the paper we study the deposit contract o￿ered by banks when they face competition
from a ￿nancial market and from other banks. When competition from other banks is too
weak, promoting competition from the ￿nancial market can be welfare improving. Com-
petition reduces the monopoly rents that banks can extract and limits the ine￿ciencies
associated with these rents. However, competition from the ￿nancial market at the same
time restrains the risk-sharing o￿ered by banks. Hence, there is a point after which more
competition from the market will decrease depositors’ welfare. When competition from
other banks is strong enough, competition from the ￿nancial market is no longer neces-
sary to reduce monopoly rents. In that case, the competition among banks limits banks’
monopoly rents. The only e￿ect of increased competition between banks and the ￿nancial
market is to reduce risk-sharing. Thus our results suggest that even though greater access
to ￿nancial markets might be preferable if competition between banks is not su￿ciently
strong, if banks compete with each other intensely enough, increased competition from a
￿nancial market might be welfare reducing.
We can also show that if in a particular ￿nancial system the competition among banks
is higher than a threshold level (and the banks’ monopoly rents are therefore su￿ciently
reduced) but households cannot e￿ciently invest at the ￿nancial market then this ￿nancial
system is preferable to a ￿nancial system with weak competition among banks but an
e￿cient access of households to the ￿nancial market.
We conclude that while in the U.S. and the UK ￿nancial systems with a less competi-
tive banking sector the increased participation of private households in ￿nancial markets
might have been preferable, these developments are likely to be welfare reducing in Ger-
many where competition between banks seems to be more intense. The still increasing
level of competition within the German banking industry makes this conclusion even more
relevant.
20One limitation of our model is that, by assumption, competition among banks does not
a￿ect the ability of banks to attract depositors from other banks in the interim period.
This is why changes to the degree of competition between banks do not restrain the
risk-sharing provided by the banks. However, allowing for such an e￿ect of competition
between banks does not change the results for reasonable parameter settings. It would
only provide a reason why, in this context, the maximum degree of competition between
banks is not necessarily optimal. We leave the study of this e￿ect in our framework for
further research.
Obviously, another interesting dimension to extend this framework is to analyze the
implications of changes in competition between banks and between banks and markets
on the stability of the ￿nancial system. Following Fecht (2004) it would be interesting to
study the e￿ect of a collapse of one bank on the overall ￿nancial system and the likelihood
of contagion of other institutions in the economy. Similar to Fecht (2004) an improved
access of households to ￿nancial markets would, on the one hand, reduce the negative
impact of ￿re-sales of troubled banks. On the other hand, banks are more sensitive to
changes in the price of claims against the corporate sector if households become more
e￿cient in investing directly at the ￿nancial market. But in addition to Fecht (2004) in
our framework the e￿ect of changes in competition between banks and ￿nancial markets
on banks’ monopoly rents is taken into account. Since banks’ monopoly rents serve as a
bu￿er in crisis periods this e￿ect would add an interesting additional dimension.
21Appendix
Proof that the monopolistic contract always satis￿es d1 ≤ M:
To show that it is never optimal for a bank to o￿er a deposit contract with d1 > M, note
that in such a case households will ￿ if they spent the e￿ort to become sophisticated ￿
deposit their funds initially with the bank and withdraw at date 1. Impatient sophisticated
depositors consume d1 while patient sophisticated depositors buy claims on the long-term
technology in the ￿nancial market. Hence, patient sophisticated depositors can buy d1
claims on the long-term technology which provide them with a consumption of Rd1 > d2
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M − q · d1 − (1 − q) ·
d2
R
s.t. q · u(d1) + (1 − q) · u(d2) ≥
χ · q · u(d1) + χ · (1 − q) · u(R · d1) (PC0
S)
d2 ≥ d1 (ICN)
d1 > M (IC0
S)
q · u(d1) + (1 − q) · u(d2) ≥ 1
1−αM1−α (PCN)
It is obvious that for any contract satisfying (ICN) and (IC0
S), (PCN) will hold. From
(PC0
S) it follows that the risk-sharing of the contract solving (P10) must satisfy
d2 ≥ Θ · d1. (25)
Hence, the degrees of risk-sharing implied by the contracts solving (P1) and (P10) are




. However, given that d1 > M the deposit contract solving (P10)
will always provide less pro￿ts to the bank than the optimal contract solving (P10) with
d1 ≤ M.
For χ ∈ [¯ χ,∞], Θ < 1 and therefore (PC0
S) is always implied if (ICN) holds. Thus the
pro￿t maximizing deposit contract in (P10) is constrained by (ICN), (IC0
S), and (PCN)
which implies {d1;d2} = {M;M}. Clearly, such a contract leaves less pro￿ts to the bank
than the point of tangency between (PCN) and the pro￿t function that is the optimal
deposit contract in (P1) for this case.




the contract solving (P1) provides
higher pro￿ts than the one that is given by (P10). But comparing (PCS) and (PC0
S)
shows that any contract solving (P10) is on a higher indi￿erence curve than a contract
solving (P1). Given that the latter contract maximizes pro￿ts along that indi￿erence
curve, pro￿ts provided by this contract must always be higher.
Derivation of ¯ χ:




q + (1 − q)R
1−α
u(M) ≤ [q + (1 − q)]u(M).
Since u(M) < 0 this condition is equivalent to
¯ χ ·

q + (1 − q)R
1−α
≥ [q + (1 − q)],
so we can write
¯ χ ≥
1
q + (1 − q)R1−α.
Derivation of χ:
The expression for χ comes from equation (4) at equality and substituting M = d1
and d2 = R
1
αd1. This yields
qu(d1) + (1 − q)R
1−α
α u(d1) = χ





Eliminating u(d1) gives the result.











q + (1 − q)R
1−α 1
1−α .
If χ ∈ [¯ χ,∞]:
Rearranging (8) yields
Π = M − (q + (1 − q) · R
(1−α)/α) · A · M.
Substitute for A to get









Π = M − (q + (1 − q) · R
(1−α)/α) ·
 
q − (1 − q) · R
(1−α)/α−1/(1−α)
· M,
Π = M −
 
q + (1 − q) · R
(1−α)/α−α/(1−α)
· M,
Π = (1 −
 








Substitute for d1 and d2 in equation (7) to get
Π = M − q · A · B · χ
1/(1−α) · M − (1 − q) · A · B · χ
1/(1−α) · M · R
(1−α)/α (26)
23Rearranging (26) yields
Π = M − (q + (1 − q) · R
(1−α)/α) · A · B · χ
1/(1−α) · M,
Π = M − (q + (1 − q) · R
(1−α)/α) ·

q + (1 − q) · R(1−α)





Π = M −
 








Π = (1 −
 








Π = (1 − A








Substitute for d1 and d2 in equation (7) to get
Π = M − q · M − (1 − q) · Θ · M · R
−1. (27)
Rearranging (27) yields
Π = M − (q + (1 − q) · R
−1 · Θ) · M,
Π = M −
 
q + (1 − q) · R
−1 ·










χ[q + (1 − q) · R(1−α)] − q
(1 − q)
1/(1−α)!
· (1 − q) · M.






We can show that ∂E [U]/∂χ < 0.
To simplify notation the deposit contract and households’ wealth can be written as
{d1;d2} =

A · B · χ






1 − δ (1 − Aα · B · χ1/(1−α))
.
A depositor’s expected utility is thus given by
E [U (d1;d2)] = q
1
1 − α
χ(A · B · M)
1−α + (1 − q)
1
1 − α



















Take the derivative of the expected utility with respect to χ, keeping in mind that M is

















































































E [U] = q · u(d1) + (1 − q) · u(d2) =





Take the derivative of E [U] with respect to Θ and set it equal to zero to get
∂E [U]
∂Θ












⇐⇒ (1 − q)Θ
−αM +










q + (1 − q)Θ
1−α
· δ · R
−1M.
Now substitute for M and multiply both sides by Θα to get
1 =
[q · Θα + (1 − q) · Θ] · δ · R−1
1 − δ · (1 − q) · (1 − R−1 · Θ)
.
The remaining steps follow from simple algebra
R − δ · (1 − q) · (R − Θ) = δ · q · Θ
α + δ · (1 − q) · Θ,
R − δ · (1 − q) · R = δ · q · Θ
α,
1 − δ · (1 − q)
δ · q
· R = Θ
α,






25We also know from equation (6) that
Θ =




























(1 − q)R(1−α) + q
= χ.
Derivation of condition (16):
We start with the condition
χ
∗ > 1,




1 − δ + δ · q
(α−1)/α
R




























qR1/(α−1) + (1 − q)
.




q + (1 − q)R(1−α)/α
q + (1 − q)R(1−α) = χ,
q + (1 − q)R(1−α)/α







(1 − q)R(1−α) + q
,
26q + (1 − q)R
(1−α)/α > (1 − q)

δ · q












1 − δ + δ · q
,
which is equivalent to
1 > δ.
To summarize, there is an interior solution if
1 > δ >
1
qR1/(α−1) + (1 − q)
.
27Derivation of households’ expected welfare in the competition case:









q + (1 − q)R(1−α)/α;µ
1/(1−α) R1/αM
q + (1 − q)ΓR(1−α)/α

,
and households’ wealth is given by
M =
1
1 − δ (1 − µ−1/(α−1))
.











q + (1 − q)R(1−α)/α
1−α  
















q + (1 − q)R(1−α)/α
1−α  












1/(1−α) (1 − δ) + µ
2/(1−α)1−α  
q + (1 − q)R
(1−α)/αα
.









q + (1 − q)ΘR−1;µ
1/(1−α) ΘM
q + (1 − q)ΓΘR−1

,
where M is the same as above and Θ is de￿ned in equation (6). Thus the households’











q + (1 − q)ΘR−1
1−α  
q + (1 − q)ΘR
−1
.










1/(1−α) (1 − δ) + µ
2/(1−α)1−α  
q + (1 − q)ΘR
−1α .
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